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Abstract 
 
How does the presence of financial markets shape the government's ability to implement social 
redistribution? Individuals do not typically constrain consumption to equal their net-of-tax income 
every period. Instead, access to financial markets allows them to allocate their resources over time. On 
the other hand, the markets that individual agents trade in are usually incomplete, in the sense that 
adjustments to contracts are costly. A mortgage, for example, helps to smooth housing consumption. 
Yet, buying a house constitutes a significant individual commitment. It cannot be changed costlessly at 
every point in time. In particular a downward adjustment often comes with significant losses. Optimal 
redistributive policy ought to take agents' involvement in such financial markets into account. I study a 
two-period endowment economy with heterogeneous income types and private information, where a 
government without commitment cannot provide any social redistribution. I show how agents' 
involvement in a financial market can improve the government's ability to commit at least to a 
partially separating allocation in the second period, enabling it to provide some redistribution across 
agents. In this world, agents borrow against their promised income and enter long-term individual 
consumption commitments. However, changing these contracts creates a deadweight loss. This 
changes the government's ex-post incentives to renege on the promised tax schedule and fully 
redistribute, because some agents would have to default on their loans. I show that whenever this 
default cost is positive, the government is able to commit to a schedule that only pools some agents of 
similar type together. In other words, it serves as a commitment device in the sense that it enables the 
government to commit not to exploit a limited amount of information. Thus, the presence of financial 
markets may in fact facilitate redistribution. 
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1 Introduction
In the presence of private information, the ability of a government to implement
social redistribution depends crucially on its power to commit to future policy. This
paper identifies a mechanism by which the existence of markets, and in particular
financial markets, may enhance a government’s ability to commit, and thus facilitate
redistribution across society. Two aspects of agents signing financial contracts are
important for a government’s ability to redistribute between them: agents’ ability to
individually allocate their resources, but also the necessity for them to individually
commit to honoring their contracts in the future. The role of the former in restricting
the scope for redistribution has been widely discussed.1 In this paper, I emphasize
the second characteristic of financial contracts: Financial markets provide an op-
portunity for agents to enter into long-term individual consumption commitments,
and to borrow against their expected future income. Changing these consumption
plans and defaulting on loans, however, is costly. A government choosing policy
sequentially has to take the continuation value of agents’ contracts into account:
Deviation from previous announcements may lead to costly default. I show that
any such default costs alter the government’s ex-post incentives to renege on the
promised transfer scheme and thereby effectively provide a commitment device for
the government.
In market economies, individuals typically do not constrain their consumption to
equal net-of-tax income every period. Instead, they use financial markets to allocate
resources over time, allowing them to make long-term consumption plans. For in-
stance, the ability to take out a mortgage enables individuals to live in a house that
reflects their life-time income rather than in a rental unit that reflects their present
disposable income every period. At any point in time, when re-optimizing redis-
tributive policy, the government needs to take agents’ consumption commitments
into account. If agents end up with less net income than they expected, they have to
adjust their consumption plans downward. Whenever agents have entered long-term
commitments, such adjustments are costly. For example, defaulting on a mortgage
may trigger costs of very diverse nature: A foreclosed house often does not sell for
the same amount as it was worth to the original owner. The administration of de-
faults is costly. But also non-pecuniary losses may occur: When agents have to move
out of the house they grew attached to, they may suffer further disutility. Chetty
and Szeidl (2007) report that nearly 65% of the average US household’s budget is
allocated to consumption commitments that cannot be adjusted costlessly. Such
commitments would not be possible without access to financial markets. In this
paper, I show that the ability of agents to enter consumption commitments, rather
than just the plain opportunity to allocate resources over time, is what makes the
existence of financial markets valuable for the government. Precisely because agents
enter into long-term commitments that cannot be adjusted costlessly, the govern-
ment may gain the ability to commit to not changing the promised transfer scheme.
Therefore, markets may in fact facilitate rather than hinder redistribution. The
paper thus provides a new perspective on the concept of a social market economy,
1See for example Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2007) and Bisin and Rampini (2006) for recent treatments.
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where markets can play a crucial role for redistributive policy.
I consider a deterministic two-period endowment economy, where agents receive
heterogeneous endowments every period. Income types are persistent and are pri-
vate information. Individual income increases over time, so that every agent would
like to smooth consumption by transferring resources from period 2 to period 1.
Moreover, a benevolent government would like to redistribute across agents. In a
seminal contribution, Mirrlees (1971) established that when the individual ability to
generate income is private information, optimal redistributive policy needs to trade
off allocative efficiency against information rent extraction. In the environment pre-
sented here, a benevolent government with an exogenous commitment device can
use a fully separating transfer scheme to implement this optimal trade-off between
efficiency and equity. Analogous to Mirrlees’ (1971) “efficiency at the top” result, at
the constrained efficient allocation, only agents of the highest type receive perfectly
smooth consumption. The government uses the degree of consumption smoothing
as an incentive for agents to truthfully reveal their income type and to contribute
to social redistribution. When agents are able to use a financial market to borrow
against their future income, every agent gains the opportunity to smooth his income
perfectly over time. The government with ex-ante commitment thus finds itself un-
able to implement the constrained efficient allocation, where it could use the degree
of smoothing as an incentive for truthful revelation. Consequently, less redistribu-
tion is implemented. In this situation, it is irrelevant whether or not agents enter
long-term consumption commitments. It is only the allocative aspect of financial
contracts that constrains the set of policy instruments available to the government.
When the government has an exogenous commitment device, the existence of mar-
kets may thus hinder redistribution.2
On the contrary, I argue that a government that cannot commit ex-ante to fu-
ture policy may gain from the existence of a financial market. Roberts (1984) was
the first to show that lack of commitment in dynamic taxation settings with pri-
vate information may lead to a government not being able to implement any social
redistribution. Analogously, in the economy presented here, when policy can be
chosen sequentially over time, the government has an incentive to use the informa-
tion about agents gathered in the past to achieve a better redistributive outcome
ex-post. Agents anticipate this behavior. The resulting time-consistency constraint
leads to the severely inefficient outcome of no social redistribution as well as almost
no smoothing of individual consumption over time.3 In this case, the government
may in fact gain from agents’ involvement in a financial market. When agents
pledge their income in a private contract and enter into a long-term consumption
commitment, deviating from past policy announcements may no longer be optimal
for the government, despite its desire to redistribute. Depending on how many
agents would have to default on their debt, the associated cost may be too high
2Many authors have considered environments in which agents cannot only contract with a principal,
but also in anonymous outside markets that make it harder to extract information from the agents
truthfully. See for example Hammond (1987) for a general treatment or Golosov and Tsyvinsky
(2007) for a more recent example from the dynamic public finance literature.
3See for example Golosov et al. (2006) for a derivation of this phenomenon in a general setting.
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to justify any welfare gains from additional redistribution. I show that whenever
default is costly, the government is effectively able to commit at least to a partially
separating transfer schedule. Here, it is the consumption commitment characteris-
tic of agents’ contracts rather than the allocative aspect that has a favorable effect
on the government’s ability to effectively commit to future policy. The presence
of financial markets and agents’ involvement therein enables the implementation of
social redistribution.
As the main result, I derive a simple condition that links the size of the default
costs and the concavity of the utility function to the degree of separation a govern-
ment is able to commit to. Intuitively, this condition equalizes the marginal benefit
from additional redistribution toward the low end of the type distribution to the
marginal cost due to default. The larger the default costs are, given the concav-
ity of utility, the more separation and so the more social redistribution is possible.
Conversely, for fixed default costs, a more concave utility function makes less separa-
tion possible, because it increases the ex-post welfare gain from redistribution across
agents. The financial market effectively provides the government with a device for
limited commitment, i.e. with the power to commit not to exploit a limited amount
of information.
In summary, this paper identifies a mechanism by which the economic environment
a government operates in can provide a potential commitment device that does not
rely on reputational considerations or political constraints and works in a finite hori-
zon. Thereby, my results help reconcile observations of policies that are suggestive
of governments being able to commit, even though there is no apparent commitment
device. In this sense, the paper provides a new perspective on the concept of a social
market economy, where the presence of well-functioning markets plays a crucial role
for social redistribution. In addition, the fact that the degree of commitment can
vary with default costs introduces a rationale for tax policy might not using all the
available information, but rather just conditioning on coarse private information.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to a recently growing literature on the interaction and co-
existence of markets and governments. One branch of this literature attempts to
identify circumstances under which markets outperform benevolent governments.
Netzer and Scheuer (2010) consider a setup in which time-inconsistency arises be-
cause of an adverse selection problem. They show that markets can outperform
benevolent governments even when they face the same adverse selection problem,
because they provide greater incentives to exert effort. In their model, markets
endogenously generate a form of commitment to refrain from full insurance and
pooling. The key characteristic of markets enabling them to implement separating
equilibria is competitiveness: Agents are free to switch their insurance provider, just
as firms can renege on insurance contracts. This two-sided lack of commitment is
what distinguishes the markets they consider from a benevolent government.
Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008a, 2008b) also compare the efficiency of
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markets and governments in a setting without commitment. They explore the im-
pact of political economy constraints on optimal redistributive policy. To that end,
they consider infinitely repeated games with equilibria that crucially rely on repu-
tation effects - a channel completely abstracted away from in this paper.
In contrast to these contributions, I am not comparing the performance of markets
and governments, but rather I ask how the presence and functioning of markets influ-
ences the government’s ability to implement redistributive policy. Some character-
istics of markets have been considered in the literature: Scheuer (2010) explores the
impact of incomplete credit markets on optimal entrepreneurial taxation. He finds
that a market friction which gives rise to cross-subsidization between different types
of potential entrepreneurs may induce inefficient entry at both ends of the skill dis-
tribution, which in turn promotes an additional corrective role for type-differential,
redistributive taxation, even when the government originally has no redistributive
objective. Unlike Scheuer’s paper, I consider a market that is not incomplete in that
sense, and instead is able to provide credit without cross-subsidization.
Bisin and Rampini (2006) study a setup similar to the one considered here, but
focus on the allocative role of anonymous markets. They find that allowing agents
access to such markets is beneficial in a world where the government has no commit-
ment, because it allows them to allocate resources over time without revealing any
information, thereby increasing efficiency. However, the government’s commitment
problem is unchanged: No social redistribution can be implemented. In contrast,
I analyze a market that does not act as a “tax haven” by enabling agents to hide
information from the government. The crucial characteristic of private contracts I
consider is that they constitute consumption commitments that cannot be changed
costlessly. This increases the government’s commitment power, enabling it to im-
plement some social insurance.
The paper is organized as follows: I start by formulating a basic two-period en-
dowment economy with private information about income types in section 2. In
section 3, as a benchmark for the following analysis, I derive the constrained ef-
ficient allocations for governments with and without commitment when only the
government has access to a borrowing technology. Section 4 extends the setup by
introducing a financial market that allows agents to borrow against their future in-
come. I derive the constraints that agents’ involvement in a financial market imposes
on the planning problem. Here, I discuss in detail the characteristics of the financial
market that lead to it functioning as a potential commitment device for the govern-
ment. Section 5 analyzes the efficient allocations under this additional constraint for
governments that can or cannot commit to future policy ex-ante. The main point
of the paper is derived: Due to default costs, an uncommited government is able to
implement an allocation with partial separation, and thus can provide some social
redistribution. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2 Endowment Economy with Private Information
The model economy lasts for 2 periods (t=1,2) and is inhabited by a continuum of
agents of unit mass. Agents derive utility from a single consumption good according
to
U =
2∑
t=1
u(ct).
Utility is time-separable, and the per-period utility function u(· ) is strictly increas-
ing, concave, and lim
c→0
u′(c) = ∞. Moreover, I assume that u displays constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. To simplify the following analysis, I assume
that agents do not discount between periods.
Agents receive heterogeneous income at the beginning of each period. Their income
types, denoted θ, are perfectly persistent over time and are private information.
Across the population, θ is continuously distributed over a support Θ = [θ, θ¯], where
θ > 0 and θ ≥ 1
2
θ¯.4 F (θ) denotes its cdf, assumed to be continuously differentiable.
Apart from income heterogeneity, agents are identical.
Per-period income is deterministic, and increases over time and across types. In
particular, I assume that it is tθ for t = 1, 2. Each agent thus receives a total income
of 3θ, and would ideally consume half of it in each period.
Suppose there exists a technology to costlessly transfer resources over time and
consider the problem of a benevolent social planner with a utilitarian objective and
equal Pareto weights on all agents. He chooses an allocation {ct(θ)}t,Θ that assigns
a consumption level to each type θ ∈ Θ, for each period t = 1, 2:
max
{ct(θ)}t,Θ
∫
Θ
(
2∑
t=1
u (ct(θ))
)
dF (θ)
s.t.
∫
Θ
(
2∑
t=1
ct(θ)
)
dF (θ) ≤ 3
∫
Θ
θdF (θ).
(1)
The aggregate feasibility constraint reflects the assumption that there exists a tech-
nology to costlessly transfer resources between periods.
Lemma 1 (First-Best Allocation)
At the first-best allocation there is full social redistribution and perfect smoothing
of consumption over time. All agents consume a constant share c1(θ) = c2(θ) = c =
3
2
∫
Θ
θdF (θ) of the economy’s total endowment in each period.
Proof: The first order condition with respect to any agent’s consumption in either
period satisfies
u′(ct(θ))− λ = 0 ∀t, θ,
4I make this assumption to rule out cases off the equilibrium path where agents and banks collude
against the government. The impact of this assumption is discussed in section 4.
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate feasibility constraint. Thus,
ct(θ) = ct′(θ
′) ∀t, t′, θ, θ′. 
3 Government with Information Constraints
Suppose that instead of an omniscient planner a benevolent government is in charge.
Like the planner, it has access to the transfer technology, i.e. it can borrow and save
at the risk-free gross interest rate R = 1. To implement the desired allocation, it
would like to institute a schedule of type-specific transfers. However, it faces pri-
vate information constraints: When conditioning the allocation on income types,
the government must rely on information reported by the agents. This turns the
setup into a policy game between agents, choosing which type to report, and the
government, choosing the transfers to implement.
To analyze this game formally, consider first the timing of action:
1. Agents learn their income type.
2. The government announces a transfer schedule.
3. Period 1:
a) Agents receive their first endowment and send a report about their type.
b) The government implements first-period transfers based on these reports.
4. Period 2:
a) Agents receive their second endowment.
b) The government implements second-period transfers. Depending on its
commitment power, these might differ from the initial announcement.
As usual in such setups with private information, it is crucial whether or not the
government can commit not to exploit the information revealed in period 1 at a later
point in time, i.e. whether or not it can commit to not changing the announced al-
location to the disadvantage of some agents after information has been revealed. I
assume that the government can always commit to the announced schedule at least
within period 1, i.e. it will always implement transfers in period 1 according to
the original announcement. The potential commitment problem that is the sub-
ject of this paper arises between periods 1 and 2. At that point the government
has learned information about the agents’ types. If it is not committed to the an-
nouncement made earlier, it may decide to implement transfers that differ from the
initial promise. Formally, the government’s strategy involves choosing a set of trans-
fer schedules T = {T1, T2, Tˆ2}, which may generally depend on information revealed
about the agents’ income types. When the government has commitment, {T2} and
{Tˆ2} are exogenously constrained to be equal. However, whether or not a government
can commit is public information, and agents take it into account when choosing
which type to report, so that in the case of no commitment only {Tˆ2} matters in
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equilibrium. For the remainder of the analysis, it is enough to keep track only of {Tˆ2}.
Let σ : Θ 7→ Σ denote an agent’s reporting strategy, a function that maps from
the set of possible realizations of income types Θ to a set of possible reports Σ. For
future reference, let σ∗ denote the direct truth-telling strategy where agents simply
reveal their type truthfully, i.e. σ∗(θ) = θ. The utility obtained from any reporting
strategy σ, given the government’s transfers {T1, T2, Tˆ2} is
U(T (σ)|θ) = u(θ + T1(σ)) + u(2θ + Tˆ2(σ)). (2)
For truth-telling to be optimal for an agent of type θ, it must be that
U(T (σ∗)|θ) ≥ U(T (σ)|θ) ∀σ. (3)
Definition 1
A (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium in the game between agents and the government
is given by strategies σe and T e and a belief system B, such that σe and T e are best
responses to each other, given B, and beliefs are derived from Bayesian updating5.
To analyze the equilibrium of this game, I employ a general mechanism design ap-
proach (as e.g. in Bester and Strausz (2001) and Skreta (2007, 2010)) where a
fictitious mechanism designer is in charge of choosing strategy sets for the agents
(the set of possible reports Σ) and for the government (the set of possible transfer
schedules T ). The fictitious planner is always able to commit. The Revelation Prin-
ciple then allows attention to be restricted to direct revealing mechanisms, i.e. the
agents’ strategy set can without loss of generality be restricted to the set of possible
types Θ. The optimal mechanism simply has to satisfy incentive compatibility for
truth-telling (3). This is true even when the government (a player in this game) has
no commitment, because the fictitious planner can restrict the government’s strategy
set as well: In particular, he can decide how much of the information agents report
is revealed to the government. Formally, this amounts to the optimal mechanism
specifying an information revelation rule m : Θ 7→ M that maps from agents’ re-
ports to some set of possible messages the government observes. The government is
then restricted to choosing transfers T that condition only on these messages. The
function m could be such that no information is revealed (i.e. m is constant), full
information is revealed (i.e. m is the identity function), but could also allow for
any form of partial information revelation (i.e. m is constant over some subset of Θ
so that some agents are pooled together). Thus, this setup allows me to explicitly
study situations where the government has limited commitment in the sense that it
can commit not to exploit a limited amount of information. The main focus of the
analysis in this paper will be on the form of the information revelation rule m as a
proxy for the commitment power of the government, and the characteristics of the
resulting allocation.
It is useful to think about the economic interpretation of the information revelation
rule. In reality, when taxes and transfers are conditional on private information, the
government must decide how people report this information. For example, the first
5In the following analysis there will be no need to explicitly derive or condition on these beliefs.
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step to implementing an income tax is to design a tax return form that people use to
report their income. The government, knowing how much information it can commit
not to exploit in the future, can choose an institutional design that asks agents only
for coarse information. The tax return, for example, could only ask for an agent’s
approximate income, or an income bracket. The function m can be interpreted as
this institution.
Moreover, note that since agents know whether or not the government has com-
mitment, they correctly anticipate the government’s incentive to re-optimize pol-
icy in the second period, and so condition their reporting strategy on {Tˆ2} rather
than on the announced {T2}. Thus, there is no need to specify both of them sepa-
rately. To summarize, the problem of the fictitious planner is to design a mechanism
Γ = (m, {T1(m), T2(m)}) that satisfies incentive compatibility for all agents:
U(T1(m(θ)), Tˆ2(m(θ))|θ) ≥ U(T1(m(θˆ)), Tˆ2(m(θˆ))|θ) ∀θ, θˆ.
It is without loss of generality to restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms6 so
that the set of possible messages is M = Θ, and to assume that m : Θ 7→ Θ is
weakly increasing. Moreover, I normalize m such that
m(θˆ) = θˆ for θˆ = min{θ : m(θ) = m}.7
In the remainder of this section I will derive the optimal mechanisms when the
government can or cannot commit, and agents do not participate in a financial
market. These will serve as benchmarks. Section 4 then proceeds by deriving any
additional constraints on the mechanism-design problem that arise when agents
can borrow individually in a financial market where they are subject to individual
default costs. Section 5 analyzes the resulting change in the use of information and
the allocation implemented.
3.1 Government with commitment
When the government has commitment, the optimal mechanism solves the following
problem:
6Due to the CRRA assumption, non-degenerate stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal. Since the
objective function is concave, introducing risk could only improve matters if some incentive con-
straints were relaxed. Making payoffs for lower type agents riskier does indeed relax higher types’
incentive constraints. However, since CRRA implies decreasing absolute risk aversion, the loss for
the low types from facing such risk is always higher than the gain in terms of relaxing incentive
constraints for higher types. See for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
7This just means that when some types are pooled together, the message sent to the government is
normalized to be equal to the lowest type in that group.
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max
Γ
∫
Θ
2∑
t=1
u(tθ + Tt(m(θ)))dF (θ) (4)
s.t.
∫
Θ
[T1(m(θ)) + T2(m(θ))]dF (θ) ≤ 0 (5)
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ
2∑
t=1
u(tθ + Tt(m(θˆ))) ∀θ, θˆ ∈ Θ (6)
m : Θ 7→ Θ. (7)
It maximizes a utilitarian welfare function (4) with equal Pareto weights on every
agent, subject to aggregate feasibility (5) and incentive compatibility (6), choosing
the information revelation rule m and the transfer schedule {T} optimally.
Lemma 2 (Information Revelation with Commitment)
If the government can fully commit, the optimal information revelation rule is such
that complete information about types is revealed: m(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof: Since the government has full commitment, Lemma 2 follows directly from
the Revelation Principle8. 
When the government is able to commit to not changing the announced transfer
schedule after information is revealed, it is optimal to implement a fully separating
allocation. The resulting constrained efficient allocation has the following charac-
teristics:
Lemma 3 (Optimal Allocation with Commitment)
At the optimal allocation with commitment:
(i) There is partial social redistribution - total consumption is increasing in type,
but less steeply than under autarky:
0 <
∂(c1(θ) + c2(θ))
∂θ
< 3
(ii) The degree of smoothness of consumption increases with type; only the highest
type smooths consumption perfectly:
c1(θ¯) = c2(θ¯)
c1(θ) < c2(θ) &
∂ c1(θ)
c2(θ)
∂θ
> 0 ∀θ < θ¯
Proof: See appendix A.1.
The setup resembles the traditional static Mirrlees (1971) model, where the desire to
8See for example Myerson (1979) and Harris and Townsend (1981).
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smooth consumption efficiently over time corresponds to the optimal labor/leisure
choice in Mirrlees’ setup. The optimal allocation depicts the classic trade-off between
allocative efficiency and informational rent extraction under adverse selection. Even
though both forms of redistribution (across the population as well as across time) are
in the government’s interest, the private information constraints introduce a trade-
off between the two. Since the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constant,
all types are willing to give up the same fraction of their total income for smoothing
consumption over time. In absolute terms, agents with higher income types would
pay more for consumption smoothing than lower income types. The government
uses the degree of smoothness as an incentive for higher types to reveal themselves
and agree to higher contributions to social redistribution - the ability to do so cru-
cially depends on the government being able to commit to the allocation ex-ante.
Perfect consumption smoothing for the highest type is analogous to Mirrlees’ (1971)
“efficiency at the top” result; non-perfect smoothing for all other types refers to the
distortion of efficiency for all types other than the highest.
3.2 Government without commitment
If policy is chosen sequentially and the government cannot commit to a schedule ex-
ante, the previously stated optimization problem becomes even more constrained.
It must be clear that when types are revealed, the government does not have an
incentive to renege on the promised allocation at a later point in time. The problem
is the same as above (equations (4) through (7)), with the following additional
commitment constraint9:
{T2(m(θ))} ∈ arg max
{Tˆ2(m(θ))}
∫
Θ
u(2θ + Tˆ2(m(θ)))dF (θ)
s.t.
∫
Θ
[T1(m(θ)) + Tˆ2(m(θ))]dF (θ) ≤ 0.
(8)
This requires the government not to change the promised transfer schedule in period
2 based on information it learned in period 1. Since types are persistent, the necessity
to provide incentives for truthful revelation vanishes, and the government in period
2 maximizes second period welfare, only constrained by feasibility.
Lemma 4 (Information Revelation without Commitment)
If the government cannot commit, the optimal information revelation rule is such
that no information about types is revealed: m(θ) = θ for all θ.
Proof: See appendix A.2.
When the government cannot commit to not exploiting information about types
in period 2, it does not find it optimal to implement any separation at all. The
argument of the proof is as follows. Because of the commitment constraint (8),
9Whereas previously agents were moving after the government, lack of commitment introduces a
second stage to the game, where only the government can move again. The commitment constraint
essentially imposes subgame-perfection on the equilibrium, as e.g. in Kydland and Prescott (1977).
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the government loses the ability to offer any separation in period 2 consumption:
Since the necessity to provide incentives for agents to reveal their type truthfully
vanishes after the first period, the government would always change the announced
allocation when provided with the opportunity to do so. Such deviation from the
ex-ante optimal contract, though, is not beneficial for all agents. A government
offering above mean type agents a worse allocation after learning their true income
is known as the ratchet effect10. Agents anticipate this, so incentives for truthful
revelation need to be provided through transfers in period 1. However, to achieve
any separation in types, the incentive payments would have to be so high that redis-
tribution would go from the bottom to the top of the income distribution - inequality
would rise compared to autarky. Thus, complete pooling is the optimal choice of
information revelation11. Consequently, no redistribution across agents (i.e. social
insurance) and almost no redistribution across time (i.e. consumption smoothing)
will be implemented.
Lemma 5 (Optimal Allocation without Commitment)
At the optimal allocation without commitment:
(i) There is no social redistribution - agents consume their total endowment; total
consumption increases in type as under autarky:
c1(θ) + c2(θ) = 3θ ∀θ
(ii) Only one type θ∗ smooths consumption perfectly:
c1(θ
∗) = c2(θ∗) =
3
2
θ∗
c1(θ) = θ +
1
2
θ∗ 6= c2(θ) = 2θ − 1
2
θ∗ ∀θ 6= θ∗.
Proof: When no information about types is revealed, the only instrument for increas-
ing welfare is handing out non-differential transfers. The government will choose
these optimally to smooth consumption for one particular type θ∗. All other agents
smooth only the part of their income equal to that of type θ∗ and consume their
remaining income on the spot.
In this economy, the government’s lack of commitment has dramatic implications.
Not only is the government unable to implement any social redistribution, the re-
sulting allocation is also very inefficient: Even though transferring resources across
time is costless, this technology remains almost unused, because it would require the
revelation of private information. Roberts’ (1984) insight applies in this economy.
10The insight that the only incentive-compatible sequence of spot contracts is one without dynamic
insurance is due to Townsend (1982).
11Brett and Weymark (2011) show that in an economy where agents have an additional choice of
labor supply, and with a discrete number of types, (partial) separation might sometimes be optimal.
Even in such an economy, though, the government’s lack of commitment worsens welfare compared
to the constrained efficient allocation with commitment.
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4 Individual Access to a Financial Market
Suppose now that agents have access to a financial market in which they can save
and borrow at interest rate R = 1, i.e. they can use the same technology to transfer
resources over time that is available to the government. Naturally, agents would use
this opportunity to smooth consumption over time. None of the allocations analyzed
in section 3 had full smoothing for all agents, so access to such a financial market
likely imposes a binding constraint on the optimal mechanism. The purpose of this
section is to derive the constraints that stem from the contracts agents may write
in such a financial market.
Bisin and Rampini (2006) showed, that in a setup similar to the one presented
here financial markets that can be used anonymously may represent a beneficial
constraint on a government without commitment. Such markets improve efficiency
in the allocation of resources over time without disclosing information about types
to the government. This leads to an increase in welfare. The government’s commit-
ment problem, however, remains unchanged. Still, no social redistribution would be
possible.
I emphasize a different mechanism: Agents use the financial market to smooth con-
sumption over time. To do that, they pledge future income in private contracts that
resemble long-term consumption commitments (e.g. mortgages). When a govern-
ment changes the allocation announced, these contracts may have to be renegotiated
or even be defaulted on - a process that is usually costly. This introduces a dead-
weight loss from deviating from the announced allocation ex-post. In fact, it will
turn out that agents’ involvement in a financial market may essentially provide the
government with a form of limited commitment. The presence of markets may thus
facilitate rather than hinder redistribution across agents. To derive this insight for-
mally, I will lay out the critical characteristics of the market environment and derive
the structure of private contracts that emerge in the economy presented. These
contracts will be treated as constraints to the mechanism-design problem. Section
5 proceeds by analyzing their impact on the possible revelation of information and
the resulting allocation when the government can or cannot commit through an
exogenous commitment device.
Assumptions about the financial market
The market consists of many banks that have access to unlimited outside funding.
Agents and banks can write contracts
[(h1(σ), h2(σ)), (b1(σ), b2(σ))] with ht, bt ≥ 0
where the bank agrees to provide ht units of consumption in period t for a payment
of bt by the agent who announced type σ.
I make the following assumptions that shape the type of debt contracts signed by
agents in this economy.
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(A1) Competition. The financial market is competitive, and banks have access to
unlimited funds.
Banks make zero profits and agents face the gross interest rate R = 1.
(A2) Enforcability. Banks can enforce their contracts with the individual agent
only. This enforcement power is never revoked.
The government is always able to commit to not shutting down the market. However,
it always moves first, so that banks have the first take on net-of-tax income only.
They do not possess any power over the government to enforce bailouts. Consider
the following modified timing of events:
1. Agents learn their income type θ.
2. A mechanism Γ = (m, {T1(m), T2(m)}) is announced.
3. Period 1:
a) Agents receive their first-period endowment θ and send a report σ(θ).
b) The government observes messagesm(σ) and implements transfers {T1(m)}.
c) Agents may contract in the financial market; first-period payments b1 and
h1 are executed
4. Period 2:
a) Agents receive their second-period endowment 2θ.
b) The government implements transfers {Tˆ2(m)}, possibly different from
the schedule announced before, depending on its commitment power. It
takes the contracts agents signed into account.
c) Second-period payments b2 and h2 are executed
Assumption (A2) is reflected in the fact that transactions in the financial market
always take place after the government implements its transfers.
(A3) Obsevability. The government can observe the contracts agents sign in the
financial market up to the level of precision with which it observes agents’ type
announcements.
This means that agents who are pooled together by the information revelation rule
m are still able to write differential contracts without revealing any additional in-
formation to the government. However, the government observes if the contracts
are feasible given the type announced. Thus, the financial market does not act as a
“tax haven”. Agents who have reported a lower income than they actually have are
not able to secretly smooth their consumption. On the other hand, all agents who
reported their type truthfully are able to smooth consumption perfectly without
revealing their precise type12.
12This restriction on the observability of transactions in the financial market is introduced for expo-
sitional convenience, and I will point out its impact on the results. The main results are unchanged
if contracts were completely observable.
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(A4) Unrestricted Access. The government does not restrict access to the finan-
cial market per se.
It only punishes when a signed contract reveals that an agent was lying about his
type. This also does not exclude the possibility that a government without commit-
ment implements differential transfers ex-post depending on the contracts that were
signed. Together with assumption (A2), this implies that the government cannot
levy a tax on ht directly.
13 It can only influence net income and thereby bound the
possible debt payments bt.
A government that can choose policy sequentially will take the contracts agents
have signed into account when re-optimizing the transfer schedule in period 2. This
is the key argument: The continuation value of agents’ contracts may be such that
the government does not find it optimal to renege on the promised allocation and so
effectively gains commitment.
(A5) Coslty default. In the case that an agent of (announced) type σ defaults on
his loan, i.e. in the case that he cannot pay the amount b2(σ) agreed upon,
his contract is renegotiated to [hˆ2(σ), bˆ2(σ)]. It is without loss of generality to
assume that the bank cuts the contracted payment h2 to zero:
hˆ2(σ) = 0. (9)
Yet, the bank remains with the power to collect any outstanding balance
d1(σ) = h1(σ) − b1(σ) from period 1. It also collects a default cost H, so
that the defaulting agent cannot consume before repaying
bˆ2(σ) = min{d1(σ) +H, 2θ + Tˆ2(m(σ))}. (10)
Banks only administer the default cost, they do not make profits with it.
There are several interpretations for this cost. First, the bank might not value h2
at the same rate the agent does. Re-allocating resources to a new project is costly
for a bank. Renegotiating contracts may also require costly administration. Second,
notice that h2 can be interpreted as collateral to the loan. It is only natural to
assume that the bank might not be able to resell the asset for the same value it had
for the particular agent. Moreover, an agent who has to default on his loan may
suffer an additional utility loss H that the government also has to take into account
when reneging on its promised transfer schedule.
The default costs H summarize the key characteristic of contracts in private fi-
nancial markets that I want to emphasize in this paper: Contracts are not easily
reversible, nor is it costless to renegotiate or default. In short, agents who have
access to financial markets may tie up their resources in a contract whose continua-
tion value needs to be taken into account when redistributing across the population.
Redistributing across agents more than initially announced becomes costly ex-post,
and so alters the government’s optimization problem.
13In reality, Austria is one of few exceptions to this assumption. The Austrian government levies a
tax of currently 0.8% of the loaned amount on the debitor in any debt contract.
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Characteristics of debt contracts
In the remainder of this section, I derive characteristics of the debt contracts agents
sign in the financial markets. Banks set borrowing limits per announced type σ that
reflect total net-of-tax income. Competition implies that all contracts will be such
that
h1(σ) + h2(σ) = b1(σ) + b2(σ). (11)
Conditioning the contracts on agents’ reports σ rather than their types θ eludes to
the fact that banks must rely on the information agents reveal about themselves.
In the first period all agents are net-borrowers. This opens up the possibility that
an agent reports a much higher type to take advantage of a high borrowing limit
and plans a sure default. To avoid such adverse selection, banks would like to verify
that agents are at least of the type they have claimed. While banks cannot verify
an agent’s type directly, notice that they can offer contracts that require a down
payment of
b1(σ) = σ + T1(m(σ)). (12)
This proof of solvency acts as a screening device, i.e. it signals to the bank that
the agent is indeed at least of the type he claimed he was.14 Competition then
ensures that each agent can find a bank offering a contract with a borrowing limit
that reflects the exact net income of the type he announced. Banks cannot gain by
offering contracts that do not require down payments, since only agents who have
misreported their type would sort into those. Notice that because of these down
payments, default is only possible if the government deviates from the announced
transfer schedule.
Agents in this economy use the market to borrow against their second-period in-
come, to smooth consumption and consume more in period 1 than they are endowed
with. Contracts will thus typically have h1 > 0. How much agents can borrow
depends on the type they have reported. Banks will set borrowing limits that reflect
total net income:
h1(σ) + h2(σ) ≤ 3(σ) + T1(m(σ)) + T2(m(σ)).
Even though the market and information structure impose some constraints, agents
can still choose between a variety of contracts. Given a schedule of transfers and
his report σ, an agent chooses to contract in the financial market to maximize his
14This setup allows me to abstract away from any additional adverse selection problem the financial
market may face. Scheuer (2010) considers the impact of a financial market with adverse selection
on optimal policy. Since I have assumed θ ≥ 12 θ¯, banks can never gain from letting agents borrow
more than their type renders feasible. Without this assumption one could imagine a case where
agents borrow much more than they can repay, forcing the government to bail them out. With
that assumption, any agent would always be able to pay even the highest types’ tax in period 2;
the default loss would then have to be absorbed by the bank.
15
life-time utility:
max
ht,bt
2∑
t=1
u(tθ + Tt(m(σ)) + ht(σ)− bt(σ))
s.t. h1(σ) + h2(σ) = b1(σ) + b2(σ)
b1(σ) ∈ {0, σ + T1(m(σ))}
b2(σ)
{
≤ 2σ + T2(m(σ)) if b1(σ) > 0
= 0 if b1(σ) = 0.
Whenever transfers are such that the agent’s net income is not smooth over time,
the optimal solution to this problem is such that
b1 = σ + T1(m(σ))
h1 =
1
2
(3σ + T1(m(σ)) + T2(m(σ)))
→ d1 = h1 − b1 = = 1
2
(σ − T1(m(σ)) + T2(m(σ)). (13)
Optimal contracts are not uniquely pinned down. In the second period, payments
could be as low as
b2(σ) = d1(σ) and h2(σ) = 0 (14)
(in this case, the agent would simply repay his outstanding debt), or as high as
b2(σ) = 2σ + T2(m(σ)) and h2 = h1 =
1
2
(3σ + T1(m(σ)) + T2(m(σ))). (15)
I refer to these possibilities as net (14) or gross (15) contracts respectively. All
contracts in between these extremes leave the agent with the same consumption
allocation. However, when signing a gross contract, agents enter a consumption
commitment for period 2 beyond the repayment of their net balance. While both
types of contracts serve to allocate resources over time and to smooth consumption,
a gross contract does that in the form of a long-term commitment. In other words,
a gross contract may be interpreted as a mortgage, where the agent constrains his
consumption of housing to a particular house not only in period 1, but also in period
2 with the help of a financial contract. If the government has ex-ante commitment,
agents are indifferent between signing net and gross contracts. However, if the gov-
ernment has no ex-ante commitment, it will turn out to be individually optimal for
agents to sign gross contracts.
The financial market provides agents with the opportunity to smooth their con-
sumption perfectly over time. Moreover, agents may sign contracts that resemble
long-term consumption commitments (e.g. mortgages). While this additional char-
acteristic of private contracts in a financial market is irrelevant for the government
with commitment, it will turn out to be crucial in determining the de facto commit-
ment power of a government that chooses policy sequentially.
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5 Commitment Through the Financial Market
When agents have access to the financial market, the private contracts described
by equations (13) through (15) constrain the choice of the optimal mechanism Γ =
(m, {T1(m), T2(m)}).
5.1 Government with commitment
When the government can commit to a schedule {T1(m), T2(m)} ex-ante, the optimal
mechanism now solves problem (4) subject to feasibility (5) and a set of modified
incentive compatibility constraints:
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ
2∑
t=1
u(tθ + Tt(m(θˆ)) + ht(θˆ)− bt(θˆ)) ∀θ, θˆ ∈ Θ (16)
taking the contracts agents sign as given. With access to the financial market, all
agents who have revealed their true type are able to perfectly smooth consumption
themselves.
Lemma 6 (Information Revelation with Commitment)
If the government can fully commit, the optimal information revelation rule is such
that complete information about types is revealed: m(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof: Since the government has full commitment, Lemma 6 follows directly from
the Revelation Principle.15
The government still implements a fully separating allocation. However, the set of
modified incentive constraints (16) implies that it cannot achieve the allocation out-
lined in Lemma 3. Due to the fact that it cannot use the smoothing of consumption
as an incentive anymore, less redistribution across the population is implemented at
the optimum.
Lemma 7 (Optimal Allocation with Commitment and Financial Market)
At the optimal allocation with commitment, when agents have access to a financial
market:
(i) There is partial social insurance, but less than without the financial market:
Total consumption is increasing in type, more than in Lemma 3, but less than
under autarky:
0 <
∂(cN1 (θ) + c
N
2 (θ))
∂θ
<
∂(c1(θ) + c2(θ))
∂θ
< 3
where N denotes the allocation derived in Lemma 3 without the market.
15If contracts were perfectly observable, i.e. the restriction in assumption (A3) would not apply, the
simple revelation principle would not apply. Then, agents who are pooled together by the function
m would also pool on the financial market so as not to reveal any additional information. Thus, by
pooling agents together, the government could influence how agents can use the financial market,
and implement allocations with non-smooth consumption for pooled agents. However, even in that
case it turns out to be optimal for the government to choose full separation over any partial pooling
arrangement, so the result is unchanged.
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(ii) All agents smooth consumption perfectly over time: c1(θ) = c2(θ) ∀θ.
Proof: Given how agents contract in the financial market, the government essentially
faces the extra constraints
θ + T1(θ) = 2θ + T2(θ) ∀θ.
Except for the highest type θ¯, this constraint changes the allocation the government
would have liked to implement. Incentives for truthful revelation can now only be
given by higher total consumption; using the degree of smoothness as incentive is
not an option anymore. Redistributing across agents thus becomes more expensive;
less social insurance is possible. 
Notice that the equilibrium is not unique: Since the government can commit to
the allocation, all agents will be indifferent as to whether or not they borrow in the
financial market, as long as they receive smooth net-of-tax income. Because of the
ex-ante commitment, it is irrelevant for the government whether or not agents have
entered long-term consumption commitments. It is only the allocative aspect of
agents’ contracts that impacts the government’s ability to redistribute across soci-
ety. The consumption allocation implemented, however, is the same in all equilibria.
I mark the resulting allocation with superscript c for future reference.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Government with Commitment and Financial Market)
A government that can commit to an allocation ex-ante does not benefit from agents
having access to a financial market.
Proof: Without individual access to financial markets, the government still had the
technology to provide perfectly smooth consumption for all agents. Yet, it optimally
chose not to do so. Thus, the extra constraint reduces overall welfare, and the allo-
cation is inferior to the allocation of Lemma 3 from the government’s point of view.
Assumption (A4) implies that the government cannot deter agents from using the
market by announcing punishments for doing so.
The presence of markets reduces the set of policy instruments available to the govern-
ment. When agents can costlessly take care of individual consumption smoothing,
the resulting allocation does not allow the government to implement the desired
trade-off between redistribution over time and redistribution across the population.
Instead, perfect smoothing over time, but less social insurance will be realized.
5.2 Government without commitment
For a government that cannot commit to a second-period schedule {T2(m)} ex-ante,
individual access to a financial market interferes with its optimization problem in
the same way as if it had commitment. But there is an additional effect: the lack of
commitment constraint (8) is modified as well. When deciding about redistributive
policy after information has been revealed, the government has to take into account
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the continuation value of the debt contracts agents hold. Redistributing away from
an agent who pledged all his income results in a costly default. Thus, for a gov-
ernment without commitment, the optimal mechanism solves the same problem as
above, but subject also to the modified commitment constraint
{T2(m)} ∈ arg max
{Tˆ2}
∫
Θ
(17)
u(2θ + Tˆ2(m(θ)) + h2(θ)− b2(θ)) I{2θ + Tˆ2(m(θ)) ≥ b2(θ)} +
u(2θ + Tˆ2(m(θ))− (d1(θ) +H)) I{2θ + Tˆ2(m(θ)) < b2(θ)} dF (θ)
s.t.
∫
Θ
T1(m(θ)) + Tˆ2(m(θ))dF (θ) ≤ 0
taking the contracts agents can sign as given. Notice that both forms of default
costs enter the consideration in the same way: They both determine the continua-
tion value of the contract the agent signed, and the government has to take potential
losses that may result from default into account.
Suppose all agents sign a gross debt contract, i.e. b2(θ) = 2θ + T2(m(θ)) for all
types. In this case, any deviation from the previously announced allocation will lead
to default. Given the enforcement power of the financial market, agents who are
forced to default will have to be at least provided with a payment that covers d1 +H
to avoid zero consumption. The above problem de facto reduces to redistributing
based on what agents planned to consume in the second period, h2:
max
{xˆ2(θ)}
∫
Θ
u(xˆ2(m(θ)))dF (θ)
s.t.
∫
Θ
xˆ2(m(θ))dF (θ) ≤
∫
Θ
[h2(θ)−HI{xˆ2(m(θ)) < h2(θ)}]dF (θ).
(18)
This formulation of the government’s problem at the beginning of period 2 nicely
depicts the main point: the government is still free to redistribute, but doing so
is costly. The default cost H conceptually enters only on the resource side of the
feasibility constraint.16
From here it is also immediate that a large enough H would prevent any devia-
tion from the promised schedule:
Proposition 2 (Limit Case: Full Commitment)
When all agents pledge their complete income in the financial market and if H ≥
1
2
(3θ¯ + T c1 (θ¯) + T
c
2 (θ¯)), the government can implement the same allocation as if it
had full commitment.
Proof: Suppose the government had promised the full commitment schedule {T c2 (θ)}Θ.
The highest type θ¯ will accordingly plan to consume hc2(θ¯) =
1
2
(3θ¯ + T c1 (θ¯) + T
c
2 (θ¯))
16Farhi and Werning (2008) consider a government that faces an exogenous cost of reform. The
analysis in the present paper can be interpreted as providing one possible micro-foundation for
such a reform cost and showing how it leads to limited commitment.
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in period 2. In the case that he has to default, the default cost is more than what
he actually planned to consume. The government would gain no resources for redis-
tribution from letting even the highest type default, and thus would never attempt
any redistribution ex-post. It can therefore implement the same allocation as if it
had full commitment ex-ante. 
The result of Proposition 2 should be understood as a limit result: If default costs
are so high that they leave no value after renegotiation, they obviously serve as a
device for full commitment. Such high default costs are unrealistic: They could be
interpreted as not offering default as an option. It is interesting, however, that a
finite default cost would be enough to induce full commitment. The more relevant
case, though, is one where default costs are too low to offer full commitment:
Proposition 3 (Information Revelation: Limited Commitment)
When all agents pledge their complete income in the financial market and if 0 <
H < hc2(θ¯), the government without ex-ante commitment is able to commit to a
partly separating allocation with an information revelation rule such that agents are
pooled above but separated below a cut-off type θ˜:
m(θ) = θ ∀θ ≤ θ˜
m(θ) = θ˜ ∀θ > θ˜
The cut-off θ˜ and transfers T must be such that
u′(h2(θ))(h2(θ˜)− h2(θ)−H) = u(h2(θ˜))− u(h2(θ)), (19)
where h2(θ) =
1
2
(θ + T1(m(θ)) + T2(m(θ))).
Proof: See appendix A.3.
The proposition states that a government without commitment gains the power
to commit to a partially separating allocation if agents hold gross financial con-
tracts, as long as they face positive default costs. How much separation is possible,
or in other words how many types at the top of the distribution will pool, depends
on the default cost H and on the concavity of the utility function. The intuition
for the constraint is simple: the marginal benefit from deviating from the promised
allocation (on the left-hand side) is measured by the marginal utility of the lowest
type (since he is the one distributed toward) times the amount of resources available
for redistribution. The marginal cost of such deviation (on the right-hand side) is
the utility loss of the highest type: his consumption is equalized with that of the
lowest type.
More separation of types, i.e. a higher θ˜, leads to a larger differentiation in pe-
riod 2 consumption h2(θ˜) − h2(θ) (due to the incentive constraints in the ex-ante
optimization problem), and in turn to a tightening of the constraint. A higher de-
fault cost H on the other hand relaxes the constraint, so that more separation is
possible. In fact, when H ≥ hc2(θ¯), the government will be able to commit to the
same allocation as the full commitment government (Proposition 2). Proposition
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3 states, however, that any positive default cost, even a very small one, allows the
government at least some commitment. Notice also that the degree of possible sep-
aration is negatively linked to the concavity of the utility function. If u(·) is more
concave, the ex-post gain from redistribution increases.17 In order to be able to
withstand the higher temptation to let a fraction of agents at the top default, more
agents have to be pooled together, and the cut-off θ˜ has to be lower.
When H = 0, the case of no commitment is recovered. As long as the utility
function is strictly concave, condition (19) is only satisfied when h2(θ˜) = h2(θ),
i.e. when there is no separation at all. As in in the benchmark case without a
financial market, when the government is not able to implement any separation in
the second period, it cannot provide enough incentives through first period transfers
to implement any social redistribution from the top to the bottom of the distribution.
The default costs essentially serve as a commitment device for the government.
With any positive default costs, the government can gain limited commitment: It
can credibly commit not to exploit a limited amount of information. By pooling
agents at the top of the distribution together, only limited information is revealed:
For agents of type θ ≤ θ˜ the true type is revealed, while for all agents of type θ > θ˜
the government only learns that they are part of the high income group, but not
their exact type.
The following lemma summarizes the characteristics of the best allocation the gov-
ernment is able to commit to:
Lemma 8 (Allocation without Commitment and Financial Market)
At the allocation without commitment, when agents have access to a financial mar-
ket, the default cost is 0 < H < hc2(θ¯) and the conditions in Proposition 3 are
met:
(i) There is partial social insurance - total consumption still increases with type,
but less steeply than under autarky:
0 <
∂(c1(θ) + c2(θ))
∂θ
< 3
(ii) All agents smooth consumption perfectly over time: c1(θ) = c2(θ) ∀θ.
Proof: All agents who report their type truthfully are able to use the financial mar-
ket for perfect consumption smoothing. This provides incentives for agents to reveal
themselves. As in the Lemma 3, the government uses the information gained about
types to implement some social insurance. 
The government, even though per se not able to commit to an allocation ex-ante, is
able to implement some redistribution across agents, i.e. it can provide some level
of social insurance. This leads directly to the following proposition:
17Because I study the problem of a government with a utilitarian objective with equal Pareto weights
on all agents, the concavity of the individual utility function also measures the potential welfare
gain from redistribution. More generally, the form of the government’s objective function is the
crucial characteristic to determine the optimal cutoff θ˜.
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Proposition 4 (Government without Commitment and Financial Market)
If default costs H are positive, a government that cannot commit to an allocation
ex-ante always benefits from agents having access to financial markets.
Proof: Proposition 3 establishes that with positive default costs H the government
is able to commit to a partially separating allocation that provides some social in-
surance - an improvement on the pooling allocation in Lemma 5 without financial
markets. However, contrary to the case in which the government has commitment
ex-ante, here the commitment power hinges critically on agents actually borrowing
in the financial market. It remains to be shown that agents will indeed sign gross
contracts in the financial market. Since agents are small, non-strategic players in
this policy game, it would be a stretch to assume that they coordinate on signing
such contracts in order to provide a commitment device for the government. Notice,
however, that once a schedule is announced and types have been reported, i.e. at the
stage of choosing a debt contract, it is individually optimal to sign a gross contract
and enter a consumption commitment for period 2.
At the beginning of period 2, the last stage of the game, the government with-
out an exogenous commitment device chooses the transfer schedule to solve problem
(17), knowing what contract each agent has signed. The government would like to
equalize consumption as much as possible. If an agents has signed a contract such
that
b2(θ) < m(θ) + T2(m(θ))
it is costless and thus optimal for the government to redistribute the unpledged por-
tion of promised after-tax income away from that agent, and redistribute it toward
lower types. This leaves the agents worse off than if he had signed a gross contract.
However, regardless of whether or not all other agents signed gross contracts, the
government will not find it optimal to let those who did default. Thus, it is a dom-
inant strategy for agents to sign such gross contracts.
The role of the financial market is to give agents the opportunity to pledge their ex-
pected resources in debt contracts, which in turn influences the government’s ability
to commit at least to a partially separating allocation. Therefore, it also facilitates
redistribution across the population. This mechanism is the central insight of this
paper. The crucial characteristic of contracts in the financial market is not that
agents are free to allocate resources. It is that in order to allocate resources, agents
are able to enter consumption commitments that cannot costlessly be changed.
6 Discussion
This paper uncovers a mechanism by which the presence of a financial market may
effectively provide the government with a (limited) commitment device, thereby en-
abling the implementation of commitment-type policies. It thus helps reconcile ob-
servations of policies that are suggestive of governments being able to commit, even
though there is no apparent commitment device. Moreover, the model provides a
rationale for why governments do not implement policies contingent on complete
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information: When they have no ex-ante commitment power, a reasonable default
cost provides them with limited commitment, i.e. with the power to commit not to
exploit a limited amount of information.
In the presence of private information, the ability of a government to implement
social redistribution crucially depends on its power to commit to future policy. In
reality, there is little reason to believe that governments possess some exogenous
commitment device. Instead, commitment must stem from the environment the
government operates in. The literature has focused on political economy constraints
as mechanisms for commitment. In contrast to that, the presented paper highlights
the fact that the economic environment might also enhance the commitment power
of the government. In this sense, the paper establishes a theoretical foundation for
what can be referred to as a social market economy, where the presence of compet-
itive markets that allow agents to enter consumption commitments plays a crucial
role for social redistribution.
People typically do not just rely on the government and simply consume their net-
of-tax income every period. Instead, they use private financial markets to allocate
their resources over time. Redistributive policy ought to take that into account. To
address the question of how the presence of a financial market shapes the govern-
ment’s ability to implement redistributive policy, I have employed a standard Mir-
rlees framework. In the economy presented, agents receive heterogeneous income,
and a benevolent government might attempt two forms of redistribution: smoothing
of individual consumption over time and social redistribution. Private information
about income types, however, introduces a trade-off between the two.
If the government can commit to future policy ex-ante, it is able to implement
a fully separating allocation. In this case, agents having access to a financial mar-
ket reduces the set of policy instruments available to the government: It loses the
ability to provide incentives for truthful revelation through the degree of consump-
tion smoothness. Agents can use the financial market to smooth consumption by
themselves. The government is deprived of the power to discriminate along this di-
mension; extracting private information from the agents gets harder. Consequently,
a government with full commitment cannot gain from agents’ involvement in finan-
cial markets. It finds itself unable to implement the constrained optimal trade-off
between allocative efficiency and equity. In such a setup, financial markets hinder
redistribution across the population.
However, if the government cannot commit to an allocation ex-ante and is thus
unable to implement social redistribution, it might gain from agents’ involvement in
financial markets. In fact, it might gain the power to commit at least to a partially
separating allocation, making some social redistribution possible. The reason is that
in order to smooth their income over time, agents pledge future income in the fi-
nancial market in contracts that induce long-term consumption commitments. Such
private contracts are typically not easily reversible. A surprise redistribution, after
agents have revealed their type and signed individual debt contracts, will lead to
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some agents having to default on their debt. Such default, however, is costly. These
default costs mitigate the government’s desire to exploit information and implement
full social insurance ex-post.
The costs may be of very diverse nature: On the one hand, one might think of
pure resource costs for administering the default on a loan. For banks, re-allocating
funds from one loan to another is also costly. A bank might not be able to resell an
asset for the same value agreed upon previously with the now defaulting agent. On
the other hand, agents might suffer a loss in utility when they have to default on
their loan in addition to the resource costs of the bank. They may have made life
plans contingent on this loan that require further costly alteration. They might, for
example, have grown attached to their house, which they financed with a mortgage,
and lose utility when they have to move. I have argued that any such costs alter
the government’s ex-post optimization problem, since it has to take the continuation
value of agents’ contracts into account. Agents’ involvement in a financial market
thus effectively provides a commitment device for the government: Even though it
has the ability to re-optimize its policy over time, it does not find it useful to do so
at any point.
How much commitment is possible depends on the size of the default costs. I have
derived a simple condition that links the size of the default costs and the concavity
of the utility function to the degree of separation a government is able to commit
to. I have shown that whenever the default costs are positive, some separation can
persist after information is revealed: The government will optimally pool agents at
the top of the type distribution together and separate all other types perfectly. This
allows for some social insurance to be implemented and is thus a strict improvement
on the no-commitment equilibrium with complete pooling and no social insurance.
The intuition for the constraint is simple: it equates the marginal benefit from
deviating from the promised allocation (as measured by the marginal utility of the
lowest type who would be distributed toward times the amount of resources available
for redistribution) with the marginal cost of such deviation (the utility loss of the
highest type who would have to default). For a given functional form of utility, the
higher the default costs, the more separation can be implemented. Conversely, for
given default costs, the more concave the utility function is, the higher the ex-post
welfare gain from redistribution would be. The government would be more tempted
to deviate from its announced policy ex-post, and so is able to commit only to less
separation ex-ante.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
First, notice that the first-best allocation is not incentive compatible: From an
agent’s point of view, his consumption allocation x1 = x2 = x is fixed, no matter
what type he reports. He then chooses to report type θˆ to solve
max
θˆ
u(x+ (θ − θˆ)) + u(x+ 2(θ − θˆ)).
Since utility is time-separable and per-period utility is strictly increasing, first and
second period consumption are not perfect complements. Thus, every type has an
incentive to hide income from the government, thereby receiving the same alloca-
tion of consumption as under truth-telling x plus the extra hidden income t(θ − θˆ).
Each agent then optimally chooses tho report the lowest possible type θ. Full social
insurance and perfect smoothing cannot be implemented.
Consider next the allocation with perfect smoothing over time for all types and
no redistribution across agents, i.e. x1(θ) = x2(θ) =
3
2
θ. This allocation is incentive
compatible. The agent solves
max
θˆ
u(θ +
1
2
θˆ) + u(2θ − 1
2
θˆ).
Optimality requires
∂
∂θˆ
=
1
2
(u′(θ +
1
2
θˆ)− u′(2θ − 1
2
θˆ)) = 0 (20)
u′(θ +
1
2
θˆ) = u′(2θ − 1
2
θˆ) (21)
→ θˆ = θ. (22)
The last step follows because u(·) is strictly concave. At this allocation, per-period
consumption xt(θ) = tθ + Tt(θ) increases with slope
3
2
. The concavity of the utility
function implies that it is strictly optimal for all agents to report the true type.
This means that the incentive constraints are not binding for any type. Thus, there
is room for welfare increasing redistribution across agents. It follows directly that
total consumption will be increasing less than under autarky, i.e.
∂(x1(θ) + x2(θ))
∂θ
< 3.
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Next, I will derive the properties of the optimal allocation that result from such
redistribution. Redistributing across agents from top to bottom requires that the
sum of transfers T1(θ) + T2(θ) should be decreasing in type, i.e.
∂(T1(θ) + T2(θ))
∂θ
= T ′1(θ) + T
′
2(θ) < 0↔ −
T ′2(θ)
T ′1(θ)
> 1 (23)
for all types θ < θ¯. Just at the highest type, the contribution to the social redistri-
bution system need not be increasing, i.e. T1(θ¯) = −T2(θ¯).
When agents choose which type to report, they solve
max
θˆ
u(θ + T1(θˆ)) + u(2θ + T2(θˆ)).
A necessary condition for incentive compatibility thus is that the first order condition
of this problem be zero at θˆ = θ:
u′(θ + T1(θ))
u′(2θ + T2(θ))
=
−T ′2(θ)
T ′1(θ)
. (24)
First, notice that (23) together with (24) and the concavity of u(·) imply that
x1(θ) < x2(θ) for all types θ < θ¯, but x1(θ¯) = x2(θ¯). That is, perfect smooth-
ing for the highest type is optimal and smoothing is distorted for all other types.
For (24) to also be sufficient for incentive compatibility, it must be the case that the
second order condition for optimality is also satisfied at θˆ = θ.
u′′(θ+T1(θ))(T ′1)
2+u′(θ+T1(θ))T ′′1 +u
′′(2θ+T2(θ))(T ′2)
2+u′(2θ+T2(θˆ))T ′′2 < 0 (25)
Further differentiating (24) yields
u′′(θ+T1(θ))T ′1x
′
1+u
′(θ+T1(θ))T ′′1 +u
′′(2θ+T2(θ))T ′2x
′
2+u
′(2θ+T2(θˆ))T ′′2 = 0. (26)
where xt(θ) = tθ + Tt(θ) and so x
′
t(θ) = t+ T
′
t(θ).
Combining (25) and (26) gives the following monotonicity requirement
u′′(θ+T1(θ))T ′1x
′
1+u
′′(2θ+T2(θ))T ′2x
′
2 > u
′′(θ+T1(θ))(T ′1)
2+u′′(2θ+T2(θ))(T ′2)
2 (27)
which simplifies to
u′′(θ + T1(θ))T ′1 + 2u
′′(2θ + T2(θ))T ′2 > 0. (28)
A sufficient condition for this to hold is that
2 >
u′′(x1)
u′′(x2)
. (29)
which due to CRRA implies
x1 >
1
2
x2. (30)
27
Autarky implies x1 =
1
2
x2, so that this condition is met when smoothness of con-
sumption is increased for all agents. Thus, the full set of IC constraints can be
replaced by the local incentive constraints (24) and the requirement that x1 >
1
2
x2.
The government’s problem then is to solve
max
{T1,T2}
θ¯∫
θ
u(θ + T1(θ)) + u(2θ + T2(θ))
s.t.
∫
Θ
T1(θ) + T2(θ) ≤ 0
u′(θ + T1(θ))T ′1(θ) + u
′(2θ + T2(θ))T ′2(θ) = 0 ∀θ.
The first order conditions to this problem yield the following optimality condition:
u′(θ + T1(θ))− u′(2θ + T2(θ)) = γ(θ)(u′′(θ + T1(θ))T ′1(θ) + u′′(2θ + T2(θ))T ′2(θ)).
where γ(θ) are the Lagrange multipliers on the incentive compatibility constraints.
From this condition it follows that when x1(θ) < x2(θ)
u′′(θ + T1(θ))T ′1(θ) + u
′′(2θ + T2(θ))T ′2(θ) < 0. (31)
CRRA implies that
x2
x1
=
u′′(x1)
u′′(x2)
u′(x2)
u′(x1)
(32)
so that
x1(θ) < x2(θ)→ x2(θ)
x1(θ)
>
u′(x2(θ))
u′(x1(θ))
. (33)
Moreover, note that
x2(θ)
x1(θ)
=
2θ + T2(θ)
θ + T1(θ)
↔ x
′
2(θ)
x′1(θ)
=
2 + T ′2(θ)
1 + T ′1(θ)
. (34)
We would like to show that the degree of smoothness as measured by the ratio x1
x2
is
increasing in type, i.e
∂ x1(θ)
x2(θ)
∂θ
=
x′1(θ)x2(θ)− x1(θ)x′2(θ)
(x2(θ))2
> 0↔ x2(θ)
x1(θ)
>
x′2(θ)
x′1(θ)
. (35)
Combining optimality (31), CRRA (33), and (34) with (24) and (28) implies that
(35) holds, and thus the degree of consumption smoothness increases with type.
This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
First, suppose the information revelation rule was such that all information reported
by the agents would be revealed to the government, i.e. m(θ) = θ for all types
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θ. Constraint (8) implies that if the government possesses any information about
types at the beginning of the second period, it will exploit it so as to equalize
consumption as much as possible. To see this, consider the first order conditions of
the government’s problem (8) at t=2:
u′(2θ + Tˆ2(θ))− λ = 0 ∀θ.
These conditions imply that the government will choose {Tˆ2} so to equalize con-
sumption across all agents, x2(θ) = x2 ∀θ. From the agent’s point of view then the
consumption allocation in period 2 is fixed, and he solves:
max
θˆ
u(x1(θˆ) + θ − θˆ) + u(x2 + 2(θ − θˆ)).
For truth-telling to be optimal, it is necessary for the first and second order condi-
tions to be satisfied at θˆ = θ, i.e. ∀θ:
(x′1(θ)− 1)u′(x1(θ))− 2u′(x2) = 0 (36)
(x′1(θ)− 1)2u′′(x1(θ)) + x′′1(θ)u′(x1(θ)) + 4u′′(x2) < 0. (37)
Further differentiating (36) yields
x′1(θ)(x
′
1(θ)− 1)u′′(x1(θ)) + x′′1(θ)u′(x1(θ)) = 0,
which reduces (37) to
− (x′1(θ)− 1)u′′(x1(θ)) + 4u′′(x2) < 0. (38)
This, together with (36) implies that for the allocation to be incentive compatible,
it must be such that ∀θ
−u
′′(x1(θ))
u′(x1(θ))
< −2u
′′(x2)
u′(x2)
↔ −u
′′(x1(θ))
u′(x1(θ))
x1(θ)x2 < −2u
′′(x2)
u′(x2)
x2x1(θ)
↔ x2 1

< 2x1(θ)
1

,
where  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is constant by assump-
tion. Thus, it must be true for all types that
x1(θ) >
1
2
x2. (39)
Moreover, (36) can be rearranged as
x′1(θ) = 2
u′(x2)
u′(x1(θ))
+ 1.
This differential equation determines the shape of the consumption schedule in pe-
riod 1. Two properties are important: x1(θ) is increasing in type, with a slope
strictly larger than 1, and with increasing slope. The lowest type, θ will receive the
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lowest period 1 consumption. To relax incentive constraints for the higher types, it
is optimal to start from the lowest possible x1(θ). A lower bound is x1(θ) =
1
2
x2.
What is x2?
x2 = 2
θ¯∫
θ
θdF (θ)−
θ¯∫
θ
x1(θ)dF (θ) (40)
The second summand cannot be solved without further assumptions on the utility
function. But we can use a conservative lower bound to see what the government
would at most be able to achieve with a fully separating allocation. To that end,
suppose we ignore that x1(θ) has to be increasing with increasing slope, and rather
assume that it will increase with constant slope x′1(θ) ≈ 2. This is not a bad approxi-
mation, since constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution implies u′′′(·) < 0 and
so u
′(x2)
u′( 1
2
x2)
≥ 1
2
is not a terrible assumption. This lower bound allows us to compute
an upper bound on x2:
x2 ≤ 2
θ¯∫
θ
θdF (θ)−
θ¯∫
θ
1
2
x2 + 2(θ − θ)dF (θ) (41)
↔ x2 ≤ 4
3
θ. (42)
This leaves the lowest type at best with the consumption allocation [2
3
θ, 4
3
θ]. Notice
that this means he is distributed away from in the aggregate and also does not gain
any smoothness. This cannot be optimal from a social welfare point of view. It
means that the only separating allocation that can be implemented is one that in-
creases inequality and lowers welfare compared to autarky, and thus it is not optimal.
Notice that the argument does not change when the government learns only partial
information about types. Since the second-period allocation is fixed, providing in-
centives for any separation through first-period transfers is so costly that it is not
optimal to do so. Thus, the optimal information revelation rule is one where no
information is revealed, i.e.
m(θ) = θ ∀θ.
This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition states that a government without commitment is able to implement
an allocation with at least partial separation, if all agents pledge their complete in-
come in the financial market. Strictly positive default costs alter the ex-post problem
of the government: Even after the revelation of information, it might not have an
incentive to redistribute fully, because this would lead to costly default by agents
who are redistributed away from.
The proof proceeds as follows: In a first step I will establish that the government
can commit to an allocation with an information revelation rule where agents with
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income types above a threshold θ˜ are pooled together, while all agents below the
cut-off are completely separated. The second step derives the optimal cut-off type,
dependent on the the size of the default costs H and the concavity of the utility
function.
First notice that the following Lemma holds:
Lemma 9
If the government wants to default, it will always default on the highest (observed)
type first. Even if the density of the highest types is large (e.g. due to pooling at
the top), it prefers to randomize and default on some of the highest types rather
than on lower types.
Proof: Since ex-ante incentive compatibility implies that the promised allocation in
t = 2 is increasing in type, the gains from redistributing ex-post are highest when
letting the highest types default. The default costs H, on the other hand, are con-
stant per default. 
Suppose agents above some cut-off θ˜ are pooled together. Even if it is not opti-
mal to default on all of them, it might still be profitable for the government to
default only on a fraction pi of them. The reason is that neither the resources gained
nor the gain in welfare from redistributing these resources are linear in pi. The re-
sources saved are optimally distributed toward the lowest types. Thus, the gain is
the highest for the first redistributed dollars and decreases thereafter.
Let θˆ denote the type below which agents get extra resources when the govern-
ment lets a fraction pi of agents above the cut-off θ˜ default. The following graph
clarifies notation:
The resources gained for redistribution are
pi(1− F (θ˜))(h2(θ˜)−H − x2(θˆ)). (43)
This is because the types who are forced to default will receive the same allocation
x2(θˆ) as the agents at the bottom of the distribution who are distributed toward.
θˆ is a function of the resources gained, and so a function of pi so that the gain is
generally not linear in pi.
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The redistribution causes a loss of utility for the defaulting agents at the top, which
by the same argument is nonlinear in pi:
pi(1− F (θ˜))(u(h2(θ˜))− u(x2(θˆ))). (44)
The gain in welfare comes from the utility gain for the types at the low end of the
distribution, below θˆ:
F (θˆ)u(x2(θˆ))−
θˆ∫
θ
h2(θ)dF (θ). (45)
The new consumption level x2(θˆ) is derived by distributing resources equally between
the defaulting high type group and the low type group:
x2(θˆ) =
θˆ∫
θ
h2(θ)dF (θ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))(h2(θ˜)−H)
F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜)) . (46)
The net gain from letting a fraction pi of agents in the pooled group at the top
of the distribution default thus is nonlinear in pi. This makes it possible that the
government might optimally choose to randomize between seemingly equal agents
instead of defaulting on all of them.
Since all agents can smooth their consumption perfectly regardless of whether they
are pooled together with other types, the government will choose as much separation
as possible to gain as much information as it can commit to not exploiting. Thus,
it will choose to separate all agents below the cutoff. This establishes the optimal
form of the information revelation rule:
m(θ) = θ ∀θ ≤ θ˜
m(θ) = θ˜ ∀θ > θ˜.
All agents below the cut-off are asked for precise information, all types above the
cut-off can truthfully only report the same income.
The second step of the proof involves finding the optimal pooling cut-off θ˜ so that
the government will not find it optimal ex-post to let even a few of the pooled agents
default, and so consequently does not find it optimal to let anyone default.
Given a promised allocation with pooling at the top, the government will choose
the optimal default fraction pi of the pooled group of agents according to
max
pi
[F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))]u(h2(θˆ))−
θˆ∫
θ
u(h2(θ))dF (θ)− pi(1− F (θ˜))u(h2(θ˜))
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s.t. h2(θˆ) =
[
θˆ∫
θ
(h2(θ))dF (θ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))(h2(θ˜)−H)
]
(F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))) (47)
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1. (48)
The problem states that the government maximizes the welfare gain from defaulting
on a fraction pi of the pooled agents subject to how many agents can be provided
with higher consumption depending on the resources saved by not paying out the
promised high income to the high types. As before, I denote by θˆ the cut-off below
which agents are better off after the redistribution. The government wants to dis-
tribute the resources saved to the low types such that it makes optimal use of the
highest marginal utilities of more consumption. As a result, all agents up to type θˆ
will get the same consumption as the type θˆ was promised ex-ante, i.e x2(θˆ) = h2(θˆ).
Of course, the government will choose to provide the same level of consumption to
the agents who were just forced to default. The cutoff θˆ is obviously endogenous to
the choice of pi - the constraint (47) defines the optimal cutoff implicitly.
The first order condition to this optimization problem, disregarding constraint (48)
for the moment, is:
[F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))]u′(h2(θˆ))∂h2(θˆ)
∂pi
− (1− F (θ˜))[u(h2(θ˜))− u(h2(θˆ))] = 0 (49)
where
∂h2(θˆ)
∂pi
=
(1− F (θ˜))
[F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))]2 ((h2(θ˜)−H)[F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))]
− [
θˆ∫
θ
h2(θ)dF (θ) + pi(1− F (θ˜))(h2(θ˜ −H))]).
(50)
Note that since θˆ is always chosen optimally depending on pi, by the Envelope
Theorem the derivative of θˆ with respect to pi need not be taken into account. First
note that since
θˆ∫
θ
h2(θ)dF (θ) = F (θˆ)h2(θˆ)− pi(1− F (θ˜))(h2(θ˜)− h2(θˆ)−H).
we can rewrite
∂h2(θˆ)
∂pi
=
(1− F (θ˜))(h2(θ˜)− h2(θˆ)−H)
F (θˆ) + pi(1− F (θ˜)) > 0 (51)
and so the first derivative simplifies to:
d
dpi
= (1− F (θ˜))
[
(h2(θ˜)− h2(θˆ)−H)− (u(θ˜)− u(h2(θˆ)))
]
. (52)
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The second order condition to this problem is always negative:
d2
dpi2
= (1− F (θ˜))u′′(h2(θˆ))(h2(θ˜)− h2(θˆ)−H)∂h2(θˆ)
∂pi
< 0
Thus, there is only one optimal default probability pi∗. Next, I will derive a condition
under which the government will find it optimal to choose pi∗ = 0. For pi∗ = 0 to
be optimal, we need the first derivative (52) to be less or equal to zero at pi = 0.
Less than zero makes pi = 0 optimal because of the non-negativity constraint (48)
disregarded before. Setting pi = 0 leads to θˆ = θ. Then evaluating (52) at pi = 0,
gives the following final condition:
u′(h2(θ))(h2(θ˜)− h2(θ)−H) ≤ u(h2(θ˜))− u(h2(θ)). (53)
Given H and the functional form of u(·), the government can commit to a schedule
{h2(θ)}Θ that pools agents above θ˜ and satisfies constraint (53). In fact, should this
condition not bind, fewer agents can be pooled together, which is preferable for the
government. Thus it will always choose θ˜ such that the condition holds with equality.
It remains to be shown that for any positive H some separation is possible, i.e.
there exists a θ˜ > θ such that condition (53) is satisfied. Notice that when there is
no separation (θ˜ = θ) and H > 0, the condition is always slack:
u′(h2(θ))(−H) < 0. (54)
Thus, there is room for separation until the constraint binds, as long as H > 0. This
concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
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